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first time on appeal (R. 36-42, 193-202, 208-09, 233-46).3 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a 
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing 
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate 
court will not consider that ground on appeal.'1). 
POINT II 
IN LIGHT OF ITS RESOLUTION OF THE WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH QUESTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S ATTACK ON 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING 
THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
affidavit supporting the search warrant is based solely on his 
claim that Willden's initial detection of the odor of marijuana 
was the result of an unconstitutional search, and that if the 
information about the smell of marijuana were stricken, the 
remaining information in the affidavit could not establish 
probable cause. Because the trial court permissibly found that 
Willden's initial entry into defendant's home by placing his hand 
on the front door did not violate the Fourth Amendment, this 
Court should also uphold the court's related ruling that the 
warrant affidavit properly contained the information that the 
odor of marijuana was apparent to Willden while he was on the 
porch. See State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 
3
 Defendant did argue that he sufficiently resisted 
Willden's hand on the door "to show the defendant was not 
consenting to the officer doing what the officer [was] doing" 
(R. 199). Insofar as this could be interpreted as a "scope of 
consent" argument, it clearly refers only to the point at which 
defendant resisted the officer's hand on the door. It is not an 
argument that the officer's mere placing of his hand there — 
before any resistance from defendant was apparent — exceeded the 
scope of defendant's consent. 
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1993) (magistrate's determination of probable cause for warrant 
is overturned on appeal only if the magistrate, given totality of 
the circumstances, lacked a substantial basis for determining 
that probable cause existed). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
and defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this H^kay of April, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (/ 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this of April, 1993. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 920458-CA 
v. i 
STEVEN ASHLEY ROGERS, : Category No- 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Did the trial court reasonably find that the 
officer placed his hand on the front door to defendant's home to 
keep it open based on defendant's consent to leave his door open, 
and thus the officer's minimal intrusion into defendant's home 
was constitutional? 
A trial court's findings of fact are deferentially 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App. 
1990). 
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that the 
search warrant for defendant's house was valid because it was 
based on information that was legally obtained by the police? 
"In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable 
cause to support a search warrant based on an affidavit, [the 
appellate court] will find the warrant invalid only if the 
magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a 
'substantial basis' for determining that probable cause existed." 
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with four counts of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, all third degree felonies, 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992) (R. 7-10). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized 
pursuant to a warrant-based search of his house allegedly in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution (R. 28). After an evidentiary hearing, the 
trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 101-05). 
The matter then came before the court for trial on 
stipulated facts based on the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing (R. 212). Based upon the State's request, 
2 
the court found defendant guilty of one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance and dismissed the remaining 
counts (R. 212-19). The court entered judgment on the one count 
and sentenced defendant to a term of not more than five years in 
the Utah State Prison, but stayed the sentence and placed 
defendant on three years' probation (R. 93-94). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court found the following facts which are 
supported by the evidence presented at the suppression hearing: 
1. On December 2, 1991, Metro Narcotics 
Officers Steve Willden [sic]1 and Kevin Judd 
went to Defendant's home to investigate an 
anonymous "tip" in which the caller indicated 
that a man named "Steve", residing at 1935 
South 900 East, was dealing in large 
quantities of marijuana and there were large 
amounts in the residence at the time. 
2. As they were searching for a place to 
park their vehicle, the police officers saw 
two males and one female, one of them wearing 
clothing consistent with gang membership, 
enter the residence. 
3. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence, 
the officers, Willden and Judd, identified 
themselves and asked to come inside and speak 
with Defendant who identified himself as 
"Steve." 
4. The Defendant told the officers that they 
could not enter the home and the Defendant 
stepped outside onto the porch to speak with 
them. 
5. When the officers asked the Defendant for 
identification so they could write their 
1
 The transcript of the suppression hearing indicates that 
the officer's name was Steven E. Weldon (R. 128). This 
inconsistency will not again be noted, and all references 
hereafter will be to Willden. 
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report, Defendant said it was inside the 
residence and he would have to go inside to 
get it. 
6. The officers asked Defendant to leave the 
door open for their safety while he went 
inside and Defendant agreed to leave the door 
open. 
7. Based on their training and experience in 
narcotics enforcement, the officers were 
concerned about weapons in the house because 
people who deal in narcotics are often armed. 
8. During the conversation on the porch, 
Defendant appeared nervous and upset and each 
time he went through the door, he opened it 
only enough to slip in or out. While on the 
porch, Defendant kept the door closed. 
9. After Defendant slipped inside the 
residence, he began closing the door. 
10. At that time, Detective Willden put his 
hand on the door to keep it from closing and 
reminded Defendant that he had agreed to keep 
the door open, thinking that the Defendant 
had forgotten. 
11. At the point in time at which Willden 
used his hand to keep the door from closing, 
he smelled the odor of marijuana coming from 
within the residence. 
12. After Detective Willden smelled what he 
suspected from his training and experience to 
be marijuana coming from within the 
residence, he pushed the door open and 
stepped inside to secure the individuals who 
might be there and to prevent the destruction 
of evidence. 
13. When the officers entered the residence, 
they explained to Defendant that they could 
smell marijuana and they again asked for 
permission to search the residence. The 
Defendant denied the request. 
14. Detective Judd called for backup help 
from other officers and when they arrived, 
Judd and Willden went to obtain a search 
warrant based upon the information obtained 
from the anonymous phone call, the 
verification of the individual named Steve at 
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the described locationf and the odor of 
marijuana. 
15. Upon returning with a Search Warrant, 
the officers found approximately four pounds 
of marijuana, as well as other items 
connected to the sale of marijuana, and 
arrested Defendant. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereafter Findings) at 
1-3 (R. 101-03) (Appendix A). 
Although the trial court did not include it in the 
findings, the officers' testimony indicated that after Willden 
put his hand on the door, defendant continued to push on the door 
in an effort to shut it, and a struggle ensued between Willden 
and defendant at the door before defendant eventually yielded and 
the officers gained full entry to the house (R. 136, 179, 185-
86). The State would concede that when defendant continued to 
push on the door and struggled with Willden, his consent to 
keeping the door open had effectively been withdrawn. 
Based upon its findings of fact, the court concluded 
that Willden's act of placing his hand on defendant's front door 
to keep it open constituted a reasonable and minimal intrusion 
into the privacy of defendant's home based on (1) safety concerns 
and (2) defendant's consent to leave the door open, coupled with 
the officers' belief that he "had forgotten to do so in his 
nervousness." Findings at 4 (paras. 2 & 3) (R. 104) (Appendix 
A). Further, the court concluded that the search warrant, which 
was based in part on the representation that Willden had smelled 
marijuana from the porch when the door was open, was valid 
because no information obtained as a result of the officers' full 
entry into defendant's home was used to establish probable cause 
for the issuance of the warrant, JEd. (paras. 5 & 6). See also 
Warrant & Affidavit (Appendix B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court permissibly found that defendant had 
consented to leaving his door open while he retrieved 
identification from inside his house, that Detective Willden had 
placed his hand on the front door of the house to prevent its 
closing pursuant to defendant's consent to leave it open, and 
that Willden smelled marijuana at the same time that he placed 
his hand on the door. Defendant fails to show that those 
findings are clearly erroneous. Because the court's factual 
findings resolve the issue of whether Willden's initial entry 
into defendant's house (i.e., the placing of his hand on the 
door) violated the Fourth Amendment, this Court, applying the 
deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review, should uphold 
this portion of the court's ruling. 
Because the trial court permissibly resolv€*d the 
initial entry issue against defendant, this Court should also 
uphold the related ruling that the search warrant affidavit was 
not deficient for including information obtained by Willden upon 
his initial entry (i.e., the detection of the odor of marijuana). 
Defendant's only challenge to the affidavit is that the alleged 
illegality of Willden's initial entry rendered the products of 
that entry unusable for purposes of obtaining the warrant. The 
trial court, having permissibly rejected defendant's challenge to 
the initial entry, properly rejected the challenge to the 
affidavit and search warrant. 
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Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress and defendant's 
conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PERMISSIBLY FOUND THAT 
DETECTIVE WILLDEN'S ACT OF PLACING HIS HAND 
ON THE DEFENDANT'S FRONT DOOR WAS PURSUANT TO 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO KEEP THE DOOR OPEN, 
AND THUS THAT ACT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A FOURTH 
AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously 
concluded that Detective Willden's placing of his hand on 
defendant's front door to keep it from closing did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, defendant contends that 
Willden's act of putting his hand on the door, which concededly 
constituted a warrantless search, could not be justified under 
any of the following theories: (1) probable cause and exigent 
circumstances, (2) consent search, or (3) plain smell doctrine. 
He then attacks the validity of the search warrant, under which 
all the incriminating evidence was seized, on the ground that the 
supporting affidavit was deficient because it relied on Willden's 
detection of the smell of marijuana at the time he placed his 
hand on defendant's front door allegedly in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
A. Probable Cause/Exigent Circumstance Exception 
The State concedes that, given the facts of this case, 
the probable cause/exigent circumstance exception to the warrant 
requirement does not provide a clear basis for upholding 
Willden's minor intrusion into defendant's home by placing his 
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hand on the front door. Therefore, in arguing for an affirmance 
of defendant's conviction, the State will not rely on the trial 
court's determination that Willden's initial entry was justified 
by the officers' concern for their safety. See Findings at 4 
(para. 2) (R. 104) (Appendix A). 
B. Consent 
1. Trial Court's Findings 
A more obvious route to affirmance lies in the trial 
court's finding that Willden reasonably stopped the door from 
closing based on defendant's agreement to leave the door open 
while he retrieved his identification from the house and on 
Willden's belief that defendant, due to his nervousness, simply 
had forgotten about the agreement when he proceeded to shut the 
door. See Findings at 2-3 (paras. 6, 10), 4 (para. 3) (R. 102-
03, 104) (Appendix A). While the consent justification 
admittedly presents a close question, this Court should uphold 
the denial of defendant's motion to suppress on that ground. 
Initially, defendant asserts that the trial court's 
findings do not reflect a finding that defendant consented to 
leave his door open. Br. of Appellant at 26. However, even a 
cursory review of the court's findings reveals that it found 
defendant consented to leaving his door open. The court stated: 
The officers asked Defendant to leave the 
door open for their safety while he went 
inside and Defendant agreed to leave the door 
open. 
Findings at 2 (para. 6) (R. 102) (Appendix A). It is difficult 
to conceive of a clearer expression on the point. 
Defendant then argues that, even if the court found 
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consent, the evidence does not support that determination. Br. 
of Appellant at 26. However, this Court "will not disturb the 
trial court's factual determinations underlying its decision to 
grant or deny a motion to suppress unless they are clearly 
erroneous." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citations omitted). Factual findings are not clearly erroneous 
unless they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or the 
appellate court reaches a "definite and firm conviction" that the 
trial court was mistaken. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah 
App. 1992). Due regard must be given "to the trial court's 
ability to observe the demeanor and judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Jackson, 805 P.2d at 766 (citations omitted).2 
2
 Defendant suggests that, because the trial court adopted 
the findings of fact drafted by the prosecutor "in the complete 
absence of the trial court's [sic] ever articulating the court's 
resolution of the facts," this Court should give less than the 
traditional deference to the lower court's findings. Br. of 
Appellant at 20-21 n.l. However, neither the circumstances of 
this case nor the case law cited by defendant support such an 
approach here. 
First, the court's comments to counsel at the sentencing 
hearing concerning the findings of fact belie defendant's claim 
that the court never articulated its resolution of the facts (R. 
108-09) (Appendix C). If defendant means to suggest that the 
court blithely accepted the prosecutor's version of the facts 
without any independent consideration of the evidence, the 
court's comments positively refute that claim. The court clearly 
had an independent memory of the evidence and, indeed, stated on 
the record his preliminary conclusion on one critical fact: that 
Det. Willden had smelled marijuana after he placed his hand on 
defendant's door but before the struggle with defendant occurred 
(R. 109). Moreover, the court indicated that it would consider 
the proposed findings of fact that each party had independently 
prepared (R. 108). 
Second, contrary to what defendant seems to suggest, as 
long as a court signs submitted findings, the appellate court 
must assume that it found the findings "satisfactory in all 
particulars." State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 
(Utah 1990). Accord Automatic Control Prod. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, 
-9-
Willden testified that defendant agreed to leave the 
door open while he went inside the house to retrieve 
identification (R. 135). That uncontradicted evidence alone is 
sufficient to support the court's finding of consent. Similarly 
flawed is defendant's attack on the court's finding that M[a]t 
the point in time at which Willden used his hand to keep the door 
from closing, he smelled the odor of marijuana coming from within 
the residence." Findings at 3 (para. 11) (R. 103) (Appendix A). 
While defendant may disagree with the inferences drawn by the 
trial court, its finding is nevertheless supported by the 
evidence. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) 
("'The mere fact that on the same evidence the appellate court 
might have reached a different result does not justify it in 
setting the [trial court's] findings aside.'" (quoting Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2585 (1971)); State v. 
Rochell, No. 920309-CA, slip op. at 9 (Utah App. April 1, 1993) 
(Bench, J., concurring in result) (same). 
Willden repeatedly testified that he smelled marijuana 
when he placed his hand on the door (R. 135-36, 160, 173). That 
testimony, although not entirely clear as to precisely when 
Willden smelled marijuana, reasonably supports the inference 
drawn by the trial court: Willden smelled marijuana at the same 
Inc., 780 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1989) (a trial court may freely 
adopt the findings submitted by the prevailing party). Only when 
a trial court totally abdicates "its decision-making function to 
the lawyer who prepared the document," would one justice of the 
supreme court advocate less deference to those findings. 
Automatic Control, 780 P.2d at 1263-64 (Zimmerman, J., concurring 
in result). 
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time he put his hand on the door, and before the struggle with 
defendant occurred. Indeed, as recognized by the parties below, 
resolution of this disputed fact was critical (R. 108-10) 
(Appendix C). 
In sum, defendant's challenges to the court's findings 
of fact are without merit. He fails to show that those findings 
are clearly erroneous; therefore, they should be upheld. 
Further, the court's findings that the officer placed his hand on 
the door pursuant to defendant's consent, and smelled marijuana 
at the same time he did so, effectively resolved the unlawful 
search issue insofar as the initial entry was concerned. Because 
the trial court's findings are supported by the evidence, under 
the deferential, clearly erroneous standard of review, this Court 
should uphold this portion of the court's ruling that Willden did 
not violate the Fourth Amendment by placing his hand on the door 
and smelling marijuana at that point. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 
U.S. 104, 113 (1985) ("an issue does not lose its factual 
character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the 
ultimate constitutional question"). 
2. Scope of Consent 
As an alternative argument, defendant contends that, 
even if defendant did consent to leaving his door open, Willden's 
crossing the threshold by putting his hand on the door exceeded 
the scope of defendant's consent. This argument was not 
presented below, and therefore should not be considered for the 
-11-
first time on appeal (R. 36-42, 193-202, 208-09, 233-46 ).3 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a 
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing 
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate 
court will not consider that ground on appeal."). 
POINT II 
IN LIGHT OF ITS RESOLUTION OF THE WARRANTLESS 
SEARCH QUESTION AGAINST DEFENDANT, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S ATTACK ON 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING 
THE SEARCH WARRANT 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the 
affidavit supporting the search warrant is based solely on his 
claim that Willden's initial detection of the odor of marijuana 
was the result of an unconstitutional search, and that if the 
information about the smell of marijuana were stricken, the 
remaining information in the affidavit could not establish 
pBebabie thesferial court permissibly found that Willden's initial 
entry into defendant's home by placing his hand on the front door 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, this Court should also 
uphold the court's related ruling that the warrant affidavit 
properly contained the information that the odor of marijuana was 
apparent to Willden while he was on the porch. See State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1993) (magistrate's 
3
 Defendant did argue that he sufficiently resisted 
Willden's hand on the door "to show the defendant was not 
consenting to the officer doing what the officer [was] doing" 
(R. 199). Insofar as this could be interpreted as a "scope of 
consent" argument, it clearly refers only to the point at which 
defendant resisted the officer's hand on the door. It is not an 
argument that the officer's mere placing of his hand there — 
before any resistance from defendant was apparent — exceeded the 
scope of defendant's consent. 
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determination of probable cause for warrant is overturned on 
appeal only if the magistrate, given totality of the 
circumstances, lacked a substantial basis for determining that 
probable cause existed). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, the Court should 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
and defendant's conviction. ^^_ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /^^day of April, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this of April, 1993. 
Z3. 
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Salt Lake County Attorney 
RUTH J. MCCLOSKEY, Bar No. 2153 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
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Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
STEVEN ASHBY ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 921900105FS 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
Based upon the Defendant's Motion to Suppress and the 
testimony of witnesses, arguments, and memoranda of counsel, the 
Court now makes the followings: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 2, 1991, Metro Narcotics Officers Steve 
Willden and Kevin Judd went to Defendant's home to investigate an 
anonymous "tip" in which the caller indicated that a man named 
"Steve", residing at 1935 South 900 East, was dealing in large 
quantities of marijuana and there were large amounts in the 
residence at the time. 
2. As they were searching for a place to park their 
vehicle, the police officers saw two males and one female, one of 
them wearing clothing consistent with gaj« membership, enter the 
residence. 
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3. Upon arriving at Defendant's residence, the 
officers, Willden and Judd, identified themselves and asked to come 
inside and speak with Defendant who identified himself as "Steve." 
4. The Defendant told the officers that they could not 
enter the home and the Defendant stepped outside onto the porch to 
speak with them. 
5. When the officers asked the Defendant for 
identification so they could write their report, Defendant said it 
was inside the residence and he would have to go inside to get it. 
6. The officers asked Defendant to leave the door open 
for their safety while he went inside and Defendant agreed to leave 
the door open. 
7. Based on their training and experience in narcotics 
enforcement, the officers were concerned about weapons in the house 
because people who deal in narcotics are often armed. 
8. During the conversation on the porch, Defendant 
appeared nervous and upset and each time that he went through the 
door, he opened it only enough to slip in or out. While on the 
porch, Defendant kept the door closed. 
9. After Defendant slipped inside the residence, he 
began closing the door. 
10. At that time, Detective Willden put his hand on the 
door to keep it from closing and reminded Defendant that he had 
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agreed to keep the door open, thinking that the Defendant had 
forgotten. 
11. At the point in time at which Willden used his hand 
to keep the door from closing, he smelled the odor of marijuana 
coming from within the residence. 
12. After Detective Willden smelled what he suspected 
from his training and experience to be marijuana coming from within 
the residence, he pushed the door open and stepped inside to secure 
the individuals who might be there and to prevent the destruction 
of evidence. 
13. When the officers entered the residence, they 
explained to Defendant that they could smell marijuana and they 
again asked for permission to search the residence. The Defendant 
denied the request. 
14. Detective Judd called for backup help from other 
officers and when they arrived, Judd and Willden went to obtain a 
search warrant based upon the information obtained from the 
anonymous phone call, the verification of the individual named 
Steve at the described location, and the odor of marijuana. 
15. Upon returning with a Search Warrant, the officers 
found approximately four pounds of marijuana, as well as other 
items connected to the sale of marijuana, and arrested the 
Defendant. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The initial entry occurred when Detective Willden 
placed his hand on the door to prevent it's closing and this entry 
was a reasonable entry. 
2. The intrusion into the privacy of Defendant's home 
was minimal and was justified by the officers' concern for their 
safety based on their observations of the individual who had 
previously entered the home, their experience with individuals who 
deal in narcotics being armed, and the Defendant's re-entry into 
the home thereby possibly alerting other individuals to police 
presence and possibly gaining access to weapons. 
3. In addition, it was reasonable that the officers 
believed the Defendant had agreed to leave the door open and had 
forgotten to do so in his nervousness. 
4. The odor of marijuana was detected by Detective 
Willden while he was in a location where he had a right to be, i.e. 
the front porch with one hand preventing the full closing of 
Defendant's door. 
5. The second entry into the home occurred when 
Detectives Judd and Willden went inside to secure the premises. 
There was no information obtained as a result of that entry that 
was used to provide probable cause for the Search Warrant. 
6. The Search Warrant was valid, being supported by 
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legally obtained evidence which provided probable cause to search 
the residence. 
7. All of the evidence being offered by the State was 
legally obtained# without violation of Defendant's rights under 
either Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of Utah, nor 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. 
8. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied and all of 
the State's evidence is admissible. 
DATED this /£> day of July, 1992. 
Approved as to Form: 
JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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APPENDIX B 
IS" THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SHLT LAKE D E P A R T > R T * B * * J W C T J ' 8 U R T 
Third Judicial District 
IN A\D FOR SALT LAKE COL'NT'l , rTATE OF VTA'r. 
. JAH-29 1993 
SE.AiCK
 fcAB8AST ^ I t f f l j P C T 
Deputy Cj 
COUMY OF SALT LAKE, sTATE Or UTAH 4\ jA°[Q 0 [0*7^ 
To any peace officer in the Starve of Utan. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before :..e oy 
Defective Ste'.e *"j 11 den , I an. sat-sfieu that there is 
probable cause to believe 
Tnat ( ) on the ptrbonls) of 
( ) i\ the \ehiclevs) drsjribed ab 
tX, on tht premises k n c n as 1935 South S-J-0 East, a gra;. 
stucco, single far.ii lyt residence, wit:: the numbers ciea:i> mainrj. ^n 
it. 
In the City of Salt Lake , County ci Sa-t Lake, S;?.:r o: 
Utah, there ID ;.CW certain pxoperty or evidence Gtsci ibeci as: 
Marijuana, scales, packaging nateriais, pa: ap:ier;.al la, cocunieMa 
pertaining to or showing: residence, proceeds of narcotic 
trafficking, disposition of narcotic tiafflcktng proceeds, 
distribution of a controlled substance, and U.S. currency, 
and that said property or e\idence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully, possessed, or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, ur 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a jj.t-<i.is 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(XJ consists of a;: i t*-ni or constitutes evidence of ill •=•*;] 
cor.duct, po^se^bcfd b.. a part> u; the iilega. cc;*du t. o 
{ , cor.sisis-. cf an item or ecn*ii:utes e*. . d.-nje of iiie-.:;! 
Owncjci, pv'.svebhei b> a jerbon >r **i: i > n^t a pa: t> tc 
the illegal c. J:.I!-JC*. . i.N'ott. i e i <; ;•«•• • -jk4 => ..: Ui^h Cc.'e 
\n.iv. xat-d, 7 7-l^-'S( 1*) 
02?4 
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SEARCH VAhRWT 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMA \DE LL> , 
( ) in the da> time 
(X' at any time day or nignt .good uuse ha*. ii.~ been ir/;u,:. 
( ; '^o execute without notice of auikontv or purpose, ;praof 
under o^th being bho^n that the ooject of \'n^^ aearc.i .iiu; 
be quit.kl> destroyed ^ r disposed of or that har.n n,a.. 
result to an\ perstn if notice were given; 
to r.ake a search cf the above-named or described person(s), 
vehicle(a) , and premises for tne herei:i-ab j\e describee properL\ o. 
evidence and if >O*J find the same or an> pai t Hereof, tc bring it 
forthuitn before me at th». Third !iicu.t Court, County of Salt la.e, 
State of Utah, or retain sum i-rupert.* in >our custod> , sab.ee* tc 
tne orde.- of t\i=> court. 
GIVEN" UNDER MT HA\"D and dated tnis 2- uaj a JX^t>4)^, i.^ /. 
0225 
STATE Or UTAH 
Lounty of Sail Lake 
BEFORE: fr<.t )-< 
JtDGE 
IN THi THIRD CiRU'iT LUl'RT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
i\ AND FOR SAi-'i LAKE COlNTf, bTATE uF ITAH 
^ ^ WSTWCT CPURT 
Thiro Judicial District 
) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
4 50 South 2nd Eatyt 
ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says. 
That he has reason to believe 
Thai I ) on the person(s) of 
i ; in the vehicle!s) described as 
it . 
(A ) on the premises known as I9/.5 South 9C0 East, a gray 
sinfcle i'an.iiy, residence, with the numbers cieariv ir.arhed or. 
i n in— t * t y o t ?L?—_±__ *--v:>r. , L out:t y J I sa- t L S K - ? , S I -%t f 
lia':.. there is nou certain property or evidence iescrioed a^ : 
Mar i.; jar. a, scales , packaai Hi" rate rials, pa raphe .T. a 1 la , c.oc ji:.e:.'. » 
.jertaining to or fc;,o^ing: residence, proceeds of narcotic 
trafficking, disposition of narcotic trafficking proceeds, 
distribution cf a controlled substance, and U.S. currency. 
a no saic! property or e\idence; 
( \i -'-ii L r . a 
(X ) hci» b-ren 
fully acMUxi-ed or Is un. a*. : ui^y p-ssf^T 
u&ec ;o ccmn.it cv conceal <- pubj.c offei. 
{X; is being possessed i.ith the purp^sv to use ii a>. 
of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes e\idence of ii 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal cond 
consists of an item oi constitutes evidence of ii 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a pa 
the illegal conduct. ;Xote requirements of Utah C 
Annotated, 77-2?-3(2) ] 
( ) 
be 
U C t , 02 
legal 
rty to 
-lie 
Affia.:t believes t;.e property and evidence desc. ibed abc-.e is 
t-vice.:•:•*• of the crime(s) of DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SoBS/ANCE/ 
POSSESSION' OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
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AFilLAMT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for cssuun .%e of a search wair^ni 
are : 
Your affiant is Letectixe currei.ti> assigned to the Metro-
Narcotics 7as.\ Force. Your affiant has been a pciice officer f.r ten 
>eais and experience in narcotics investigation for over u u »ca;^. 
Your affiant has received training in narcotics trafficking frc:.i 
*>rAf Department of. Justice, FBI, and numerous seminars. 
On December 2nd, 1991, Detective Kevin Jucd was contacted Lv i.n 
anonymous male who stated that at 1:*35 Scut;; S»;u East, a gra> h us-, 
there was an individual named Stevt*, who ^as involved m the bale of 
large quantities of marijuana. Dete.%ti\e Judd asked this ar.or.'-n.ous 
individual how much was a large quancit>. This individual stated 
that Steve was holding one hundred pounds of r.ari juar.ii at this tln.e. 
This individual would not identify himself, ar.d hjng up at this tin,*. 
On Deceir.bei 2nd, 1991, Detective Judd and your affiant wr;.c :o 
1935 South 900 East, the address sough; to be searched. Contact wv-tr. 
made a!, the residence with an indiwd^al who identified hir.s-lf a^ 
S-e*. e Ruxei's. Rogers was very ner\ous. R..gers denied your affiants 
reiii^st to come into the residence a:ic spea^ to hini. Rogers did 
asree to obtain identification from within the residence. As J.ogtrs 
opened the door, an odor of marijuana could be s>meiied cominfc ;"rj;! 
the residence. Entry was then m;-de into tne residence, and rebecs 
was advised that we could smell tne n.arljuana, ar.d was tgsii. Ltkrd 
for cor.sent. Rogers requested a bea::h wa:ranc. A*, which tin.--, :••„ 
was obtained and ycur affiant left the residence, whi/.i was S-.CJ.'C, 
by other members of the Metro-Narcc t i :s ".as.-: Force. 
Your affiant has smeliel marijuana on niJi-nous ether «.c:as..:.s, 
and knows from his experience and training what marijuana smells 
like. Your affiant believes from the infermation rece.ve: froi: the 
anonymous c-tizen and from the smell of marijuana within the 
residence, that marijuana will be fcur d uithin tne residence sjt.ghc 
to be searched . 
You.* affiant it an e\|;erien.:-ec ;.oiice officer and f .•;•:: ii:„i 
experience kru w that scales. pac;.ag.!K r.ater.uls. paraphernal.a, 
dccuuenis pertaining to or slio'^ im. : les.d'.-r.c-i, piocee-.s of r.a.'c ; 1«. 
trafficking:, disposition of narcotic trafficking proceeds, 
distribution of a controlled substance, and b.S. currency axe i\..u.;i 
where narcotic trafficking is taking place. 
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AFFIDAYI7 F<>R SEARCH VAHRANT 
Your affiant considers the x:i fo: ma Lion receded fr;m th-r c::.f ident.al 
informant reliable because (if any information is uotair.ea fro:, ai. 
unnamed source! 
The aiionvm-jus citizrn contacted the Metro-Xarcoti ?s Str.kc Foxxe on 
his our* free uill. He is not a paid informant, or *s he working off 
an*v type of criminal charges. Y->ur affiant ni.ous n- :ta^.t for the 
anonymous indi\idjal t«. have ca.ied with f^ .lsrj info.rn.--t.cn ccnierinng 
the distribution of marijuana fr^ -m the resident s;.ught to be 
searched. 
Your aff:ant has verified the a"ju\e information frcr the c~..f ident i^ l 
informant t<, be correct and accurate through ihe following 
independent i.n\ es t igation : 
WHEREFORE, the affiant 
seizure of said items; 
prays t..at a Search V.ir.'ant oe issued for the 
i i i n L.ie ca • t lme • 
,X, a t an;, t i r . e da> c ; n . g h i b - . - a u c ^ t h e : c ; s ie«a&. n t o 
b e l i e - e : i i s n e - t s s s i y t .) s e * ^ e -.he p : \ p e . t v p r i »r '. o - t 
be.*:** M-ncea.i.ed, « ; c s : r o ' e J , « ar.a-.ev , .r a j i e ; r . : , L^ «... 
e t h e r g j c d r ^ a s _,:.», v. - w . t : I t *s c u r -en*!;, r . i g h t t lrm . 
Ti" e r e s i d e n c e - s f . u r r e : i t i > l-ei ;g s e r u . e h , ~i .,.,: a i . i c r i t see*.s t .> 
s e r . e t h r i . a n r a : t * : : . t i i a t e l / i v . : e r t . . a n wai t , u i t i l t h e i:-.y l i s : : , 
h o ^ r s . Yjur> a f f . a r t d o e s n e t w , s h t j d e t a i n t h e r e s i d e n c e anv •^-».*£ -r 
th . : i i ; s . ec-. s s . i i .. . 
SUtSQRIBEJ AXD bWORX TO BEFORE XE t h i s 
1 9 1 1 . 
02?8 
R E 11F N 7 v ^ E ArtL n »• \ r re A 
. \ 0 . 
Tne p e r s o r i a i p r o p e r t > u : s ' . t u o e . o - / >«r\ o . . \ •->:. en*.- i n v e n t o r 
H P a*, t a c n e t f i e r t t O ) wa^ r.aKen i ron , i n e prc-r.. ; t e : *.-c a n a a e s c r i u e c 
a s 1*3/ S o u t h yoi/ E a s t , a g r a ' . b u < : ' : ? , s i r . ^ . e . i i : \ i r t ' j i U ^ r . 
ar.a i ri»:n t n e \ v . n i c . e ( s ) a t b i - r i j - ' ; a-r 
a n a ircir . tnt» ^ r & o n - s ) ui 
bv \ i r i U ' a s - ra rcn w a i r ^ n t c^ r . -o U .t "* C I V e <1 e!!1 ' J t l ' 
:-.;.': e \ e : u > . - o rr. o^«:s.e r^-T--r 
o : : r . e i o o \ t ? e r . t : u e a e c u : 
LnkE C 0L'N T*i , S ' M 7 £ t>Y IT.-H 
J HIT 1? C I r. 11 i 1 . 0". K . . I .\ A.. 1' r JR s A1" 
i ^ ? t \ _ e : 4 . VN „ : J j e n ;>' i*r. ;::> t n : £ • - a r . c i . : ! - a t . e . e . t t f c 
GO s^ccii ir.a!. i n e a t t a c h e d i n v c - . t i . - y : o n t : t i : . ^ c- i r i . e and 
d e i a j i t - r . a r o o u r . i of . . I I t h e ; . r o r ? : i v t a ^ e n b~ "nt \ « K J ' - . ' t n e v \ r r a n 
°-
T
* t n e 2nd d a y of I ' e c e m b e r , i b_v 1 • 
0229 
Ai. of the u o e r i v t a . \ en b* v i r t u e c : sa;«i ua : ra i t x*: . * oe 
r e t a i n e d in nv cu-:t*.d> S u b j e c t t c t h e o l d e r of t h i s c o u r t of or a.iy 
o*.ner c o u r t : ;i u; . ich t h e o : f e : . s e i n r e s p e c t 10 w:i*. n the p r o p e r t v 
o r t h i n g s t3i\»r., i s i n d o l e . 
•6^2— 
:
 £^0±p 
-t 
1 / 
KU<m-!itrfo<~s \- <*. - ^ 
->- \ 
C e n t r o i l e d S u b s t a n c e : 
A o a i c e r t a i n . : : 2 a u o r o d n i a u ^ v o:.e 
A bag .•••ontaii i ing iwc be-4s w i t n a p i . r o 
r r^r i i u i n a . 
;. JU.KI o : : ; a r . j u a r . a . 
v i i r . : i te iy cr.e :»ur.ce of 
,\ uag cc..p i- .airani. a p p r o x i m a t e ' " ^ e \ e r cranio o ; : . s : i ocy .»i.i 
n i i ^ h r o o i r s . 
Tnr<~e D H S S c c n - . a i . ' i i n : a p i . - r c . i r a?-.-Iv -.w._> poui .de of 
! i a r . , j u c n a . 
A ' n a : c o n t a i n i n g n p p r c \ : n . a * . . * ! • j r e r.-cjnd of r . a r i :iic 21a . 
A b a g c o : ; t a . n i n a 2 c r - . - a i - i c p ? , i s u S u C t f C amph-. tan. i r : "-s ; . 
p . ; r a p ; . e r n a l i a : 
" •. L I ' Sc l i e , >io I: LCD 2 '. J 1 . 
.".a; b ^ o a i e , : o ^ o . t ;•. _e < < i ^ . . . 1 " £ n in ; , w i t . ; v : . r : 
\ ; ^ ' H ] L J \ , 'O reo S a i i ' j u u h ' , w ; t h s-r-.ds a n d t t e .T . - . 
C t i l u l a r p h o n e '•*: t h 3 l a t t e r i e s a n d c h a r g e r . 
5 fc 0 - S 1 S 0 
Mi r o e .' i a r . e o u s d c :u? .e : ; t : - , r r . \ r . v - , and pan- f r s 
P a c : \ 3 s : n g m a : . e r i a l b ano b :.»o.\e.^ o." : . a g s , 
S y r i n g e , m i r r o r , and g l a s s \ i a l u i t : : u n i t e r e s i d u e 
O h a u s t r i p l e b e a n s c a l e . 
C i t a r box w i t h m i s c e l l a n e o u s p a r a p h e r n a l i a . 
Co2 R e g u l a t o r . 
r 1 r e a r e s : 
: . t - o , r:. c e . : ; 
au'~ r nuno sn .* \ . 
:>/ . : J U i i ' J «(. 
023f 
iFirearms, centinuec): 
'Z(. : S I N , 12 eaus*.-, b;:o:rur. rounds, (ammunition) 
Page I). Mvney: 
= i L : 5 2 , o 2 C . u u , in i jrrency . 
1-ai.e ±.. n\ra;.ner:;a;i:.: 
siZ: Unite power suppi* box tith attached lamp, 
-231: White power suppi*- i'*pt- box. 
s^E: b~x c< n^air.i::* 2 i:.:*^ e iar.*ps . 
= -Z: Box cor*iain'.nsi r.vdrr.Dor.ic tubing. 
= 51: luo boxes :cntsin:r.? oias:.': ouc^ets. 
. our p vwer ;i;ve::e: fiecir.cj. aevicc-: 
: u'c cow~r sur/oiies ana two .amps, ":i. 
tlec;.x:ai • n i i ^ i ^ n in cardbcai\ bo:: 
V". o ei<Ci r icc-vi -cr.ver tt.-rs . 
C e l l u l a r r : . .ne i n g r r . v c a c k . 
v.ii?. .-i ..-us i t .-rr. * L e. "CI' 
0232 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooooooooooooo—Pr\ r V A J P J A l 
lUftUjMtoL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN A. ROGERS, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 921900105 
J U D G M E N T 
and 
S E N T E N C E 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on July 10th, 1992, the above-
captioned cause of action came on regularly for hearing 
before the HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL, one of the Judges of 
the above-named court at the hour of 10:30 a.m. of said day 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
MS. RUTH McCLOSKEY 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
MR. JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
Attorney At Law 
39 Exchange Place,#200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
FEED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicltl District 
AU6 04 fi92 
SALT LAW COUNTY 
<pj?j»jfe/»jfl0 1 r\n 
9 
10 
MS. MeCLOSKEY: I prepared Findings of Pact and 
Conclusions of Law to submit to Your Honor today;Mr. O'Conn-
-ell has too. We have some disagreement as to what the evi-
dence in this case was factually?so we decided it would 
probably be easier to prepare our 
THE COURT: Submit those to me. I'll review themJ 
May have to prepare my own. 
8
 | MR. O'CONNELL: Right. The problem is it's now 
been a couple of months and— 
MS. MeCLOSKEY: Yeah. 
11
 I MR. O'CONNELL: And I fully admit and maybe not 
'
2
 | remembering it correctly—one of us is wrong in not remember-| 
-ing it correctly. 
THE COURT: Well, I remember the case and I remem-( 
-ber. 
MR. O'CONNELL: I think the essence of the differ-} 
-ence is that I feel the State is trying to run two kinds of 
I believe, conflicting views rand one is that the defendant wsj 
trying to keep the officers from seeing inside, and slipping 
20
 through the door and shutting so they couldn't see inside. 
21
 They also want to go with what the officers did test-
22
 -ify. One officer did and I thought he was joking maybe 
2
' because he was smiling when he said it. But that the defendj 
24
 -ant had just inadvertantly forgotten and didn't really mean 
25
 to shut the door. He was just helping him out by putting up 
13 
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12 
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21 
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24 
25 
his hands. But the other officers described it as a 
struggle;that in fact the other officer said I went to assistI 
because I saw the struggle develop and you know—this idea of 
a consent—I think the legal issue in this case is can you do| 
^ protective search on a house like you can on a car? That's 
the way I saw it. Were you finding consent or were you find-l 
-ing the officer had it and it was reasonable for them to see] 
the inside of the house for their safety. 
THE COURT: My impression was and I am going to 
review this and review my notes—and I take very careful notefe. 
My impression was that the officer was able to detect the aroma 
of marijuana before the struggle ever ensued—may have had hip 
hand on the door, but it was about that time. 
MR. 0' CONNELL: Ok. All right. Well, may I ask 
if you do review the testimony, review the testimony of both 
officers. 
THE COURT: I will. 
MR. 0'CONNELL: I beliee the second officer's tes-| 
-timony, in my opinion, straightened that out but 
THE COURT: I know I certainly recall that there 
was some evidence by one of the officers of somewhat of a 
struggle which the officer didn't appear to be 
MS. McCLOSKEY: They came out basically on cross, 
which was by leading questions. Your Honor, so 
MR. 0' CONNELL: You finding that they were working 
under a consert? 
I 
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THE COURT: Well, I'll review these and I'll 
MR. O'CONNELL: Well, all right. Now 
THE COURT: I'll go ahead with the sentencing and 
you are Steven Ashley Rogers? 
MR. ROGERS: Yes. 
MR. 0" CONNELL: Go ahead. We can go. 
THE COURT: You know of any legal reason why sent-
ence cannot be imposed? 
MR. O'CONNELL: No, Your Honor. I have a couple of, 
other matters, but I think we can take them up after sentenc-
ing, having to do with substitution of counsel, and asking 
for a transcript and so on. 
THE COURT: Ok. 
MR. O'CONNELL: We can take that up. 
THE COURT: Go ahead with the sentence then. You 
reviewed the report, counsel? 
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any comments to make? 
MS. McCLOSKEY: Yes, Your Honor. In this particular 
case I think I would like to make the court aware of the otheif 
case that Mr. Rogers has pending. I believe after he entered 
the plea in this matter, he was subsequently picked up;and as 
a result of that he was charged with a number of offenses, in4 
-eluding the possession of heroin and possession of marijuana;) 
again, similar kinds of things to what he was charged with in 
this case. 
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